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INTRODUCTION 
Boards of publicly traded corporations in the United States and in 
Canada play a crucial role in the functioning of capital markets. Directors 
act as advisors as well as monitors of management. They provide access 
to resources and external networking opportunities, allowing firms to grow 
and prosper.1 Perhaps most importantly, the board is responsible for 
making decisions regarding mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the 
composition of these boards is a critically important question to the area 
of corporate governance.  
 
In the United States women make up 17.7% of board members of 
Russell 3000 companies.2 In Canada women comprise 15% of board seats 
for reporting issuers.3 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in 
20094 and the Canadian securities regulators in 20145 introduced 
disclosure based models to address this issue. In the fall of 2018 California 
implemented Senate Bill 8266 mandating that corporations with principal 
executive offices located in California, including corporations 
incorporated in jurisdictions other than California, add a certain number 
of women to their boards depending on the size of board. 
 
                                                   
* LLM Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University. 
1 AARON A DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: 
CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY 26–27 (2015). 
2 2018 Gender Diversity Index Key Findings: 2018 Progress of Women 
Corporate Directors by Company Size, State and Industry Sector, 2020 WOMEN 
ON BOARDS (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.2020wob.com/companies/2020-gender-
diversity-index. Larger companies tend to have proportionally more women on 
their boards than smaller corporations. Id.  
3 Multilateral Staff Notice 58-310: Report on Fourth Staff Review of 
Disclosure regarding Women on Boards and in Executive Officer Positions, ONT. 
SEC. COMM'N  (Sep. 27, 2018) at 1. This review also notes that as the market 
capitalization increases, so too does the percentage of female directors. Id. There 
is also great disparity across different industries. Id. 
4 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c) (2010); SEC, Proxy Disclosure Enhancements; 
74 Fed. Reg. 68, 334 (Dec. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Final Rule]. 
5 National Instrument 58-101F1: Disclosure of Corporate Governance 
Practices [hereinafter NI-58-101F1].   
6 SB 826, Section 2, adding §301.3(f)(2) to the Corporations Code 
[hereinafter Bill 826]. 
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This paper will first provide a critical, comparative look at the 
Canadian and the federal American responses to the under-representation 
of women on boards of large, publicly traded corporations. There will be 
a discussion about the competing conceptions which emerge in addressing 
the regulation of women on boards in the United States and Canada and 
why each jurisdiction implemented its policy when it did. The conceptions 
arising out of questions about under-representation of women on boards 
tend to fall within two categories: business case rationales and normative 
rationales. Given the competing conceptions of this issue, this paper will 
attempt to demonstrate how the regulatory regimes fit within these 
conceptions and the solutions which follow each conception. An argument 
will be advanced that not only does each disclosure regime7 fail to provide 
a solution to the underlying issue it is attempting to regulate, but also 
neither regime even advances the goal the regulators purport to be 
advancing. Finally, a closer look at the polarizing reactions to Bill 826 
provides a hint as to the future direction of the American and Canadian 
debates.  This paper will be one of the first to discuss Bill 826 and what it 
may mean for the U.S. and Canada.  
 
I. WHY THE REGULATORS DID WHAT THEY DID WHEN THEY DID 
 
A. The US’s Reactive Approach to Corporate Governance Issues 
Corporate and securities law reforms in the US are often 
reactionary, following either financial crises or market failures and 
scandals. In 1934 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was 
established as part of a series of reforms responding to the 1929 stock 
market crash. Its mandate was to protect investors, sustain fair, orderly and 
efficient capital markets and facilitate capital formation,8 which is still the 
SEC’s role today.9 Following the various scandals of the early 2000s, in 
2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which is an example of 
what Professor Anand defines as a mandatory corporate governance 
                                                   
7 The disclosure regimes being referred to are the American federal board 
diversity regime and the Canadian board diversity regime. 
8 Angela Foster, A Quest to Increase Women in Corporate Board 
Leadership: Comparing the Law in Norway and the U.S., 26 WASH. INT'L L.J., 
381, 397 (2017). 
9 The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/ 
introduction-investing/basics/role-sec (last visited Feb. 17, 2019). 
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regime.10 Sarbanes-Oxley requires enhanced financial reporting among 
other things. It is rigid, rather than enabling in its requirements.11After the 
financial crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act was enacted in 2010 as a reaction to this massive 
market collapse.12 At the same time as Dodd-Frank was implemented 
(with its objective being to protect the public from future financial failings 
and abusive financial practices),13 the SEC amended the Proxy Disclosure 
Requirements ostensibly to protect investors. These amendments included 
a diversity disclosure requirement.14 
 
The Diversity Policy and Why It Was Implemented 
 
Item 407(c) of Regulation S-K15 requires that publicly traded 
companies in their Proxy Statements disclose whether the nominating 
committee “considers diversity in identifying nominees for director. If the 
nominating committee (or the board) has a policy with regard to the 
consideration of diversity in identifying director nominees,” they must 
“describe how this policy is implemented, as well as how the nominating 
committee (or the board) assesses the effectiveness of its policy.”16 The 
SEC in its publication of this rule, stated that diversity disclosure is 
important for investors and that they had received many comments to this 
effect.17 The policy, they elaborate, although not intended to “steer 
behavior” may lead to benefits such as increased board independence and 
                                                   
10 Anita Indira Anand, An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate 
Governance Structures Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 229, 230 
(2006). 
11 Id. 
12 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No.111-203, § 972, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Its objection is stated as “An Act to 
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability 
and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the 
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive 
financial services practices, and for other purposes.” Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Luis Aguilar, SEC Speech: Board Diversity: Why It Matters and How 
to Improve It, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 4, 2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch110410laa.htm. 
15 Final Rule, supra note 4. 
16 Id. 
17 Id at 68343. 
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access to a wider talent pool of candidates.18 Their belief was that investors 
would directly benefit from these disclosures.19 The SEC intentionally 
declined to define diversity, leaving the definition up to reporting 
corporations.20   
 
However, scholars dispute whether it was truly not the SEC’s 
intention to steer behavior with these new requirements. Professor Dhir, 
for instance, reviews several criticisms of the amendments and how they 
seem to amount to public shaming on the part of the SEC.21 Luis Aguilar, 
an SEC Commissioner, made a speech in November of 201022 where he 
revealed a number of important points regarding the intention of the board 
diversity disclosure requirements. He discusses what should be done in the 
future about lack of board diversity, even encouraging companies to 
“prioritize and implement practices to increase board diversity.”23 This 
suggests that the diversity policy was very much intended to steer behavior 
in the direction of increasing board diversity. The intentions of the 
diversity policy will be discussed at greater length below.  
 
B. Canada’s Delayed Reaction Regime 
Unlike the American approach to corporate governance and 
securities law reforms which tend to be reactionary, and some may argue 
disproportionate or unrelated to the problems the reforms are attempting 
to address,24 Canada tends to take a different approach. The Canadian 
approach to reforms in corporate governance is often in part a reaction to 
the United States’ reactive regime. 
In 2009, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) published its 
proposed National Policy 58-201 “Effective Corporate Governance,” 
which included a concise history of the Canadian corporate governance 
regime’s progression. It began in 1994 with the Dey Report. This report 
titled “Where Were the Directors?” was commissioned by the Toronto 
                                                   
18 Id at 68355. 
19 Id. 
20 Id at 68344. 
21 Dhir, supra note 1 at 48–94. 
22 Aguilar, supra note 14. 
23 Id. 
24 See Roberta Romano, Quack Corporate Governance Corporate 
Governance, 28 YALE J. ON REG., 36 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-
Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV., 1779 
(2010). 
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Stock Exchange (then the TSE, now the TSX).25 It described fourteen 
recommendations of best practices for publicly traded companies.26 These 
recommendations ranged from the separation of the CEO and chair of the 
board to the orientation for new directors.27 Five years later, the TSE 
commissioned a follow-up report titled “Five Years to the Dey,” 
recognizing the importance of the original report, but also stating that 
“there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution, the TSE does not require 
compliance with the guidelines – but every year companies must disclose 
and explain any differences between their corporate governance practices 
and the guidelines.”28 Following the Dey Report, in Canada, there was a 
set of exchange-endorsed “best practices,” combined with mandatory 
disclosure for non-compliance with these best practices.29 
 
Later, in 2000, the TSE established the Joint Committee on 
Corporate Governance or the “Saucier Committee” designed to review the 
then current state of corporate governance in Canada. This was in the wake 
of the Bre-X30 and YBM Magnex scandals at the end of the 1990s.31 The 
Saucier Committee’s report, published in 2001, provided 
recommendations to the TSX that it change its corporate governance 
guidelines with a view to developments around the world.32 In 2002, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was implemented in the United States, as described 
                                                   
25 National Policy 58-201: Proposed National Policy 58-201 Effective 
Corporate Governance (2004) [“NP 58-201”]. 
26 Ruth M. Corbin, Five Years to the Dey, EUR. CORP. GOVERANCE INST. 
(1999), http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/5years.pdf. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Anand, supra note 10, at 231. 
30 Bre-X is one of the most notorious Canadian corporate scandals in 
history. A small Alberta mining company which allegedly struck gold in 
Indonesia’s stock exploded in the mid-1990s. It turned out that the projections 
being publicly disclosed were a result of tampering with core samples. Once these 
fraudulent disclosures were brought to light, Bre-X’s stock plummeted. For a full 
description, see Christopher C. Nicholls, The Bre-X Hoax: A South East Asian 
Bubble, 32 Can. Bus. L.J. 173 (1999). 
31 YBM Magnex was an American “magnet” corporation, publicly 
traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. It was in fact being used to launder money 
and once this was brought to the public’s attention, like Bre-X, the corporation 
went into receivership in 1999. For a full description see Stephen Schneider, 
Money Laundering through Securities an Analysis of Canadian Police Cases, 
4 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS. & TRADE L. 169 (2004).    
32 NP 58-201, supra note 25. 
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above. This had an important impact on the Canadian corporate 
governance regime as well. A few years later with specific reference to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Canadian securities regulators adopted NP 58-
201.33 This policy includes 18 best practices which arise from both 
Canadian and American regulatory regimes, including recommendations 
that more than half of the board should be independent, and that new board 
members should undergo some sort of orientation.34 
 
The regimes seem to diverge with the implementation of 
Sarbanes-Oxley in the United States.  As Anand notes, the United States 
adopted a mandatory regime, where Canada issued an enabling, 
disclosure-based regime.35 After the financial crisis of 2008, while the 
United States federal government was rolling out Dodd-Frank and the SEC 
was implementing its diversity disclosure policy, in 2009, Canadian 
securities regulators proposed new versions of NP 58-201 and National 
Instrument 58-101: Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices.36 In 
true Canadian fashion, the securities regulators followed the Americans a 
few years later with a diversity disclosure regime.   
 
The Diversity Policy and Why It Was Implemented 
 
Canadian securities regulators amended National Instrument 58-
101F1 to include a diversity policy for ostensibly different reasons from 
those behind the SEC’s diversity disclosure policy. In 2013, the Ontario 
government stated in its budget that it “strongly support[ed]” board gender 
diversity and that it would work with the OSC in order to increase the 
number of women on boards.37 Following this release, the OSC held a 
roundtable in the fall of 2013. The transcript from this roundtable reveals 
the intention behind the Canadian disclosure model, that is, to enhance 
gender diversity on Canadian public companies’ boards.38 This stated 
                                                   
33 National Policy 58-201: Corporate Governance Guidelines (2005). 
34 Carol Hansell, Canada Sets New Policy on Corporate Governance, 24 
INT’L. FIN. L. REV. 37, 37 (2005). 
35 Anand, supra note 10, at 229. 
36 NI 58-101F1, supra note 5. See also CSA Staff Notice 58-305: Status 
Report on the Proposed Changes to the Corporate Governance Regime, ONT. 
SEC. COMMISSION, (Nov. 13, 2009),  http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/26274.htm. 
37 Charles Sousa, A Prosperous & Fair Ontario: Budget Papers : 2013 
Ontario Budget (Toronto: Ministry of Fin., 2013) at 291. 
38 Roundtable Discussion Re Women on Boards and Senior 
Management, ONT. SEC. COMMISSION (Oct. 16, 2013), 
 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW    VOL. XII:II 
 
292 
objective is openly an attempt to steer the behavior of reporting issuers, 
which marks a departure from what the United States SEC’s supposed 
intentions were with its disclosure model.  
 
The disclosure regime regarding women on boards at present 
works in the following way. Reporting issuers39 must disclose whether or 
not they have a policy regarding the representation of women on the board.  
They must further describe what steps are taken to ensure the policy’s 
effective implementation, as well as the progress in achieving its 
objectives. If they do not have such a policy, they must disclose the reason 
why.40 The issuer must disclose whether, and if not why not, it considers 
the representation and identification of women in its director nominating 
process.41 It must also disclose whether, and if not why not, the issuer has 
targets regarding the representation of women on the board, and the 
progress made towards reaching this target.42 Finally, the issuer must 
disclose the number and percentage of women currently on its board.43 
 
The OSC’s Consultation Paper includes a statement made by the 
Minister for the Status of Women which highlights three very different 
reasons for promoting board diversity. “[B]oard diversity is not about 
quotas or tokenism. Board diversity is about better corporate decisions, 
better responses to market demographics, and better financial 
performance. It is also about the future, and having more women in key 
leadership positions to serve as role models for young women and girls."44 
Thus, within the reasons and justification which the OSC and Minister 
                                                   
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_oth_20131016_58-
401_transcript.htm. 
39 An issuer is defined by the Ontario Securities Act as “a person or 
company who has outstanding, issues or proposes to issue, a security.” A reporting 
issuer is, among other things, an issuer whose shares are publicly traded. For a 
complete definition, see Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 1.1 (Can.), 
[“Ontario Securities Act”]. 
40 NI 58-101F1, supra note 5, at item 11. 
41 Id at item 12. 
42 Id at item 13. 
43 Id at item 15. Described is the regime only as it relates to board 
nomination. There are similar provisions which relate to disclosure of the 
appointment of female executive officers. 
44 OSC Staff Consultation Paper 58-401: Disclosure Requirements 
Regarding Women on Boards and in Senior Management, ONT. SEC. COMM'N at 
6 (July 30, 2013), ["Consultation Paper"]. 
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provide for implementing regulation are better financial performance, 
better decision making, and a social justice or a “normative” rationale. 
This example typifies not only the regulator’s confusion about the 
conception of the problem itself, but also may explain why Canada has a 
policy which does not accomplish any of these goals.  
 
II. COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF THE BOX OUT PROBLEM AND 
RESPECTIVE SOLUTIONS 
“[T]he way regulation gets framed as a problem shapes the 
solutions that get conceived and adopted, as well as their prospects for 
success . . . . Advocates of new regulatory initiatives should think carefully 
about how to frame the problem of regulation and whether the reforms 
proposed are responsive to the problems identified.”45 Hence, it is crucial 
to comprehend just how the issue of women on boards is conceived if this 
issue is to be regulated properly. In both the United States and in Canada, 
there are two competing conceptions of this problem, and so two 
competing conceptions of the solution to said problem.46 First, there is the 
idea that corporations, by under-including women on their boards, are 
missing out on what Rosenblum calls the “instrumental” value of women 
or the “diversity dividend.”47 The second conception of the problem is 
given that women represent half the population and half the labor force,48 
it is simply not right that they should be so poorly represented on public 
corporate boards. Within these conceptions are a myriad of reasons for 
why women may not be advancing to the upper echelons of corporate US 
                                                   
45 Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS 
L.J. 633, 680–81 (2012). 
46 There is an assumption here that this is indeed a problem and that there 
should be some regulation to remedy it. Therefore not included is the third 
conception that lack of boardroom diversity is not an issue and therefore requires 
no regulation. 
47 Darren Rosenblum, When Does Sex Diversity on Boards Benefit 
Firms?, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 429, 431 (2017). 
48 Dhir, supra note 1, at 39. 
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and Canada including, inter alia, cognitive bias,49 the pool problem,50 and 
free choice.51 
 
The conception of the problem (that is the under-representation of 
women on boards) leads to two rationales for the solution to the problem: 
the business case rationale, and the normative rationale. Both of these 
justifications for addressing the under-representation of women on boards 
are common to the U.S. and Canada.  
 
A. The Business Case 
The business case itself has many iterations. One form it takes, 
which is very popular and politically attractive because it is linked to the 
view that a board’s duty is to increase shareholder wealth, is the following: 
enhanced gender diversity on corporate boards increases corporations’ 
financial performance.52  A number of studies relating to this formulation 
                                                   
49 See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate 
Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 
404–408 (2014) (noting cognitive bias, or "in group" bias, is present in the 
corporate management pipeline that feeds new additions to the corporate boards, 
and that individuals feel for those who are like them in race, gender, and 
ethnicity); Dhir, supra note 1, at 47–54. 
50 See Geneva R. Fountain, The Case for the Business Case Rationale, 
15 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 81, 90–91 (2016) (noting that the hiring pool is often 
limited to those with board experience, often drawing from older or retired 
members 'the pool' which few women are a part of); Dhir, supra note 1, at 38–47.  
51 Richard A. Epstein, Is Women’s Empowerment a Bureaucratic 
Imperative?, HOOVER INST. (Mar. 3, 2012), 
https://www.hoover.org/research/womens-empowerment-bureaucratic-
imperative. 
52  Aaron A. Dhir, Towards a Race and Gender-Conscious Conception 
of the Firm: Canadian Corporate Governance, Law and Diversity, 35 QUEEN’S 
L.J. 569, 574 (2010); Rhode & Packel, supra note 49; Quick Take: Why Diversity 
and Inclusion Matter: Financial Performance, CATALYST (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/why-diversity-and-inclusion-matter-
financial-performance; see Fawn Lee, Show Me the Money: Using the Business 
Case Rationale to Justify Gender Targets in the EU European Union Law, 36 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1471 (2013); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity 
Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story Board Diversity and Corporate 
Performance: Filling in the Gaps, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855 (2010); David Carter et al, 
The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance, 
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of the business case have been performed. These studies use a variety of 
financial performance metrics. I will call these the “metrics studies.” 
 
1. The Metrics Studies 
Using various financial metrics, a substantial amount of empirical 
data has shown a positive relationship between increased gender diversity 
on corporate boards and better financial performance in North America 
and internationally. Studies have shown a positive relationship between 
increased gender diversity on boards and Tobin’s Q,53 Return on Assets 
(ROA),54 Return on Sales (ROS),55 Return on Equity (ROE),56 and Return 
on Investment (ROI).57 For example, using a statistical analysis of data 
gathered from 641 Fortune 500 firms over about 25,000 firm years from 
1998-2002,58 one study found a significant and positive, causal 
relationship between the percentage of female directors and firm 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q.59 Conyon and He, in a study of 
over 3,000 public American firms between 2007-2014, found that there 
                                                   
SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 972763 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network, 2007); Fountain, supra note 50. 
53 Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio comparing a firm’s value with the 
cost of replacing its assets. CHRISTOPHER C. NICHOLLS, CORPORATE FINANCE 
AND CANADIAN LAW 2E144 (2013). 
54 Return on Assets is an accounting measure which reveals how much 
revenue can be generated from assets. It is calculated by dividing total earnings 
by total assets. Fountain, supra note 50, at 86. 
55 Return on Sales is an accounting measure determined by dividing the 
pre-tax profit divided by revenue. Nancy M. Carter et al, The Bottom Line: 
Corporate Performance and Women’s Representation on Boards (2004-2008) 
n.4, CATALYST (2011) 
https://www.catalyst.org/system/files/the_bottom_line_corporate_performance_
and_women%27s_representation_on_boards_%282004-2008%29.pdf. 
56 Return on equity is an accounting measure determined by dividing 
total income by equity, or shares. See Fountain, supra note 50, at 86. 
57 Return on Investment is another measure of firm performance 
calculated by dividing after tax net operating profit by invested capital. Carter et 
al, supra note 55, at n.5.  
58 Carter et al, supra note 52, at 12–23. The authors, although the 
evidence suggested a causal relationship, were hesitant to draw conclusions about 
causation because of the possibility that a third variable could have increased both 
gender diversity and enhanced financial performance. Id. 
59 Id. at 21–23. The authors, although the evidence suggested a causative 
relationship, were hesitant to draw conclusions about causation because of the 
possibility that a third variable could have increased both gender diversity and 
enhanced financial performance. 
 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW    VOL. XII:II 
 
296 
was a positive relationship between increased gender diversity and 
Tobin’s Q.60 Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader in a study of 127 large US 
companies from 1993 to 1998, found that board diversity had a positive 
impact on organizational performance as measured by ROA and Return 
on Investment Capital.61 Further, Schwartz-Ziv’s study demonstrated that 
gender balance on corporate boards, specifically when a critical mass of 
female directors was present on a board, was positively related to net profit 
margins and ROE.62 Eastman, Rallis, and Mazzuchelli, in a study 
conducted using data from 2011 to 2016 of corporations from the MSCI 
All Country World Index (ACWI), determined that companies with a 
critical mass of female directors outperformed those with no female 
directors as measured by ROE.63 Similarly, in 2018, McKinsey in a global 
study of organizations found that those firms in the top quartile for 
diversity on boards outperformed those in the lowest quartile measured by 
ROE.64  
 
However, there are also several studies which demonstrate either 
no relationship or a negative relationship between greater board gender 
diversity and firm financial performance using the same financial metrics 
as a measure of firm performance. For example, Carter et al in a 
subsequent study found there was no relationship between board diversity 
and financial performance using Tobin’s Q as a financial performance 
                                                   
60 Martin J. Conyon & Lerong He, Firm Performance and Boardroom 
Gender Diversity: A Quantile Regression Approach, 79 J.  BUS. RESEARCH 198, 
203 (2017). 
61 See Nicolas L. Erhardt et al, Board of Director Diversity and Firm 
Financial Performance, CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT'L REV. (2003). 
62 Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, Does the Gender of Directors Matter?, SSRN 
Scholarly Paper ID 2257867 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 
2013) at 3.-22. In this study critical mass was said to have been reached when 
there was the presence of 3 or more of a certain gender on a board. See infra, 
Section xx (insert) for a broader discussion of ‘critical mass.’ 
63 MEGGIN T. EASTMAN ET AL, THE TIPPING POINT: WOMEN ON BOARDS 
AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE, MSCI 23, 15 (2016) 
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/fd1f8228-cc07-4789-acee-
3f9ed97ee8bb. 
64 Vivian Hunt et. al., Delivering through Diversity, MCKINSEY & 
COMPANY (2018), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/organizati
on/our%20insights/delivering%20through%20diversity/delivering-through-
diversity_full-report.ashx. 
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metric.65 Adams and Ferreira, using data from 1996-2003, concluded that 
there was a negative relationship between enhanced gender diversity and 
ROA as well as Tobin’s Q.66 Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar also 
conducted a study examining Norwegian firms before and after Norway 
implemented a mandatory quota for the proportion of women public 
corporations were required to have on their boards. This study showed that 
the quota had a negative impact on firm performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q.67 Schwartz-Ziv makes an excellent point about this study. She states 
that this study is looking at a case where gender diversity was increased 
on boards in “one fell swoop,” not gradually over time and so the results 
do not necessarily showcase what lasting gender diversity means for 
corporate performance.68 Some studies above found statistically negative 
relationships as well as positive relationships between board gender 
diversity and firm financial performance, depending on the metric that was 
used. For instance, although Conyon and He found a positive correlation 
between board gender diversity and Tobin’s Q, they found a statistically 
significant negative relationship between same and ROA.69  
 
The Weakness of the Financial Performance Business Case 
Studies showing no relationship or a negative relationship 
between increased board gender diversity and firm financial performance 
pose a significant problem for proponents of the financial performance 
business case. As Rhode and Packel point out, the empirical research “has 
not convincingly established that board diversity leads to improved 
financial performance.”70 Fairfax speculates that the lack of convincing 
                                                   
65 David A. Carter et al, The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards 
and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance: Board Diversity and 
Financial Performance, 18 Corp. GOVERNANCE:  INT'L REV. 396, 408 (2010).  
66 Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the boardroom and 
Their Impact on Governance and Performance” 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, pincite?? 
(2009). 
67 Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: 
The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation 127  
Q. J. OF ECON. 137, 168 (2012).  
68 Schwartz-Ziv, supra note 62, at 8. But see Ahern & Dittmar, supra 
note 67 at 183. Ahern and Dittmar do recognize this and point out that the negative 
relationship is not necessarily because of the gender of the board, but could have 
been instead a result of the inexperienced directors appointed to fulfill the quota 
requirement. Id. 
69 Conyon & He, supra note 60, at 14. 
70 Rhode & Packel, supra note 49, at 393. 
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business case evidence is likely the reason board gender diversity has seen 
what she calls a “stagnation” in recent years.71  
 
"[M]ost knowledgeable scholars, those who do business and 
corporate finance rather than race and gender subjects, deny . . . that any 
correlation exists . . .  [and] empirical work on the subject conclusively 
finds that no correlation can be found".72 Opponents of stronger regulation 
often point to the weakness of the financial performance business case. 
One argument is that there are inherent difficulties with all of the above 
studies. It is extremely difficult to prove causation; at best what is normally 
found is correlation.73 Rhode and Packel say there may be another factor 
which is causing both stronger financial performance and enhancing board 
gender diversity.74 The McKinsey Report acknowledges that its work only 
reveals correlation and not causation and raises that it is possible that 
already high performing corporations are able to dedicate resources to 
diversity efforts, which may explain the correlation between high 
performing corporations and greater board diversity.75 The report does 
assert, however, that “in practice, this seems unlikely. We have observed 
that most companies only embark on a major transformation when they 
have a burning platform to do so.”76  
Both American and Canadian scholars have written on the 
difficulties faced by many of the studies. For example, the sample sizes in 
these studies are often small and the observations are often over a short 
time period.77 There are known methodological issues with these empirical 
studies as well, including a lack of good quality data, and measurement 
difficulties.78 In the above studies, for example, a number of them are only 
                                                   
71 Fairfax, supra note 52, at 869. 
72 Dhir, supra note 52, at 26, n.108 (citing DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO 
SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN 
OUT OF THE BOARDROOM, CRITICAL AMERICA (2007)). 
73 Fairfax, supra note 52, at 862. Rhode & Packel, supra note 49, at 386. 
See also CATALYST which states plainly that the research it cites demonstrates 
correlation and not causation; see Why Diversity and Inclusion Matter: Financial 
Performance, CATALYST (July 31, 2018), 
https://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/why-diversity-and-inclusion-matter-
financial-performance.  
74 Rhode and Packel, supra note 49, at 386. 
75 Hunt et al., supra note 64 , at 39. 
76 Id. 
77 Rhode & Packel, supra note 49, at 390. 
78 Fountain, supra note 50, at 87. 
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across periods of four or five years and some only use data from a small 
number of firms.79 Fountain also articulates that when using financial 
metrics as a measure of firm performance, inconsistent findings can still 
be reached even when the same metrics and time periods are used to collect 
data.80 No one has yet to perform a study which examines the long term 
stock performance and its relationship to increased gender diversity on the 
corporate board, at least not with data from the US or Canada. Long term 
stock performance is what Grundfest refers to as the “gold standard” of 
firm financial performance.81  
 
Defenses to the Weaknesses 
However, even with the issue of causation and lack of proof that 
increased gender diversity on corporate boards is positively related to long 
term stock performance, the business case is not dismantled. The inherent 
methodological difficulties pose equal challenges for the studies showing 
positive, negative, and no relationship. Further, no scholar has yet to prove 
that board gender diversity is bad for firms or the capital markets. Thus, 
the firm financial performance business case may still prove useful.  
What may be missing in the above studies is a regard for critical 
mass82 and shareholder protection measures. Critical mass stems from the 
idea that if there is only one female within a group, the group will only 
consider her a “token” female, who is a representative in her capacity as a 
woman. On this view, it is only once a group reaches a critical mass of 
women that the transformation occurs.83 The meaning of the critical mass 
threshold on a board of directors shifts among scholars. Some define it as 
                                                   
79 See Hunt et al., supra note 64 , at 39; Rhode and Packel, supra note 
49, at 386. 
80 Id. 
81 Rhode & Packel, supra note 49, at 391 (citing Joseph A. Grundfest, 
Diversity on Corporate Boards: When Difference Makes a Difference, ROCK 
CENTER FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Sept. 10, 2009), https://perma.cc/9K4Q-
Z8MG).  
82 The original theory of critical mass was expressed by Rosabeth Moss 
Kanter; her theory of critical mass is that women represented at token levels will 
either feel that they must over-achieve, or feel compelled to make themselves 
invisible. ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 
221 (1977). “The token must often choose between trying to limit visibility- and 
being overlooked- or taking advantage of the publicity- and being labeled a 
“troublemaker.” Id. Either way, token women will feel socially alienated and this 
may affect the impact of gender diversity. 
83 Schwart-Ziv, supra note 62, at 10. 
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twenty percent,84 thirty percent,85 thirty-five percent,86 and still others as 
three women,87 irrespective of the size of the board of which they are 
members. When scholars consider critical mass, as do Schwartz-Ziv and 
Bruno et al. in their studies, the results are striking. Schwartz-Ziv observes 
that most studies use data from boards with an average of ten percent 
female directors which may not showcase the true impact of gender that 
can be seen in more gender-balanced boardrooms.88 The contribution that 
a female director can make as one of three women rather than as the sole 
female director may be very different.89 Therefore, Schwartz-Ziv 
addresses the issue of critical mass for both genders in an Israeli context 
where there has been board gender balance for twenty years.90 The results 
of this study reveal not only that gender-balanced boards work harder, as 
indicated by a content analysis of the board meeting minutes, but also this 
hard work, the author concludes, “trickles up” to firm financial 
performance because there is a parallel positive correlation between 
gender-balanced boards and ROE as well as net profit.91 Bruno et al., in 
their study of Italian listed corporations, subject to a quota law which took 
effect over the course of six years, found that when the percentage of 
female directors was ten percent, the impact which gender diversity had 
was negative on firm performance, that the impact was insignificant at 
twenty percent, and that the relationship was positive and significant past 
                                                   
84GSF Bruno, A. Ciavarella & N. Linciano, Boardroom Gender 
Diversity and Performance of Listed Companies in Italy: A Natural Experiment, 
OXFORD LAW FACULTY 4 (2018), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-
blog/blog/2018/11/boardroom-gender-diversity-and-performance-listed-
companies-italy; Fountain, supra note 50, at 90.  
85 Rosenblum, supra note 47, at 456 
86 Schwartz-Ziv, supra note 62, at 10. 
87 Id.; see also Rhode & Packel, supra note 49, at 408–410; Dhir, supra 
note 52, at 594 n. 115; Eastman, Rallis & Mazzucchelli, supra note 63, at 4. 
88 Schwartz-Ziv, supra note 62, at 4. 
89 Id. at 6. 
90 Id. at 5, 11. This study importantly is examining boardroom 
performance in a context which has not just recently implemented a law and 
undergone a major transformation, as the Ahern and Dittmar study above did. Id. 
Further, as the author notes, the corporations in this study are Government 
Business Companies in Israel who by law must maximize profits and whose legal 
requirements are almost identical to those in the United States. Id. Thus, the 
results of this study are quite relevant to the business case in the US. 
91 Id. at 19–20. 
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twenty percent.92 They used ROA, ROE, ROIC and ROS as measurements 
of firm performance.93 
In addition to critical mass, the issue of endogeneity and reverse 
causality is dealt with in the Schwartz-Ziv, Bruno et al, and in the Conyon 
and He studies.94 Skeptics of the financial performance business case often 
lean on problems of endogeneity and reverse causality to support 
arguments against stronger regulation. It is unclear, many say, whether or 
not there is some other variable which enhances both financial 
performance and board gender diversity, or alternatively, whether better 
financial performance leads to better gender representation on boards.95 
However, in Schwartz-Ziv’s study, she asserts that it is unlikely that there 
could be a problem of endogeneity or reverse causality because she looked 
at both “below the surface” board work (the work of the board extrapolated 
from meeting minutes) and observed a positive relationship with this and 
output (financial performance). Thus, it would seem that the work of the 
board, which is positively related to a critical mass of female 
representation, has a positive relationship with ROE and net profits.96 
Conyon and He also accounted for endogeneity and reverse causality in 
their quantile regression study and concluded that lower performing firms 
are less likely to make the most of female directors’ value because of their 
perception of threats which arise out of their declining performance.97  
As theorized by Fountain, studies often do not take into account 
shareholder rights and this could account for the inconsistent findings in 
the studies above.98 In fact, Adams and Ferreira’s study showed that 
corporations with stronger shareholder rights were much more likely to 
reap the positive impacts of enhanced board diversity, whereas 
corporations with weak shareholder rights were more likely to see a 
negative impact on firm financial performance when board gender 
diversity increased.99 Thus, perhaps if shareholder rights were accounted 
for in the remainder of the above studies, we would see more consistent 
results. 
                                                   
92 Id. 
93 Bruno, Ciavarella & Linciano, supra note 84, at 26. 
94 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 66 also accounted for these factors, but 
this study was performed at a time when women represented a much smaller 
proportion of board seats and where most firms with any female directors only 
had a single female director. 
95 See e.g., Adams & Ferriera, supra note 66, at 306. 
96 Schwartz-Ziv, supra note 62, at 19–21. 
97 Conyon & He, supra note 60, at 207–209. 
98 Fountain, supra note 50, at 87–90. 
99 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 66, at 292. 
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As theorized by Fountain, studies also often do not take into 
account shareholder rights and this could account for the inconsistent 
findings in the studies above.100 In fact, Adams and Ferreira’s study 
showed that corporations with stronger shareholder rights were much 
more likely to reap the positive impacts of enhanced board diversity, 
whereas corporations with weak shareholder rights were more likely to see 
a negative impact on firm financial performance when board gender 
diversity increased.101 Thus, perhaps if shareholder rights were accounted 
for in the remainder of the above studies, we would see more consistent 
results.102 
Finally, while the empirical evidence linking director 
independence with enhanced firm financial performance is also mixed, 
corporations are still very willing to implement reforms.103 The question 
remains as to why diversity has seen so much less traction in both the 
United States and Canada.104 All in all, the financial performance business 
case may need some re-working before it is able to effect real change, but 
it does seem that the gap in the research may be filled with studies which 
account for critical mass, endogeneity, and shareholder protection 
measures.105 
2. The Governance Case 
Beyond the business rationale as calculated entirely by financial 
performance metrics, there is another version of the business case.106 This 
rationale uses empirical data, qualitative data, and theoretical data to show 
that more women on boards have a positive relationship with enhanced 
corporate governance.107 I will call this the “governance case.” The theory 
behind the governance case is that gender diversity leads to better decision 
                                                   
100 Fountain, supra note 50, at 87–90.  
101 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 66, at 292. 
102 Id. 
103 Fairfax, supra note 52, at 878. 
104 Id. 
105 The following assumption is being made: that boards themselves have 
an impact on financial performance. As Ahern and Dittmar conclude: if boards 
were simply “window-dressing” then one should not see any relationship between 
increased gender diversity and firm performance. However, because we do see a 
relationship between these two (whether positive or negative), it is likely therefore 
that boards have an impact on financial performance. See Ahern & Dittmar, supra 
note 67, at 139.  
106 Rhode & Packel, supra note 49, at 393. 
107 Id.  
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making, corporate reputation and corporate governance generally, and 
thus is better for business.108 This rationale is not directly linked to 
shareholder value as the financial performance rationale is.109 Instead, by 
enhancing governance board gender diversity brings value to a corporation 
in various other ways.110  
 
i. Better Decisions 
As Sonnenfeld outlines, the highest performing corporations are 
those with “extremely contentious boards that regard dissent as an 
obligation . . . .”111 This is consistent with many scholars’ views that 
groupthink is a common and problematic challenge faced by homogenous 
corporate boards.112 Groupthink is a phenomenon where members of a 
group are unable to consider alternatives because they place the agreement 
of the group above constructive dissent.113 Constructive dissent and 
elimination of groupthink go hand in hand.114 In theory, female directors 
are thought to bring with them an outsider perspective and rather than 
agreeing with the group as a whole, they will probe more deeply and ask 
management more challenging questions than the typical male board 
member.115 Empirical evidence suggests that diverse groups solve 
problems better than homogeneous ones.116 Furthermore, female directors 
tend to have less attendance problems than their male counterparts.117 
When there are more women on a board this also reduces the male director 
attendance problems.118 Meeting attendance is important for corporate 
governance as it is one of the most crucial ways directors fulfill their 
fiduciary duties119 to the corporation and the shareholders (in the American 
context). Thus, with more constructive dissent and better attendance this 
                                                   
108 Id.  
109 Id. 
110 Dhir, supra note 52, at 592–96.  
111 Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, HARV. BUS. 
REV. 1, 7 (2002). 
112 Dhir, supra note 52, at 151; Fountain, supra note 50, at 91; Rhode & 
Packel, supra note 49, at 393–94. For original description of group think see 
IRVING L JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS 
AND FIASCOES 9 (2d ed. 1982). 
113 Janis, supra note 112, at 9. 
114 Carter et al., supra note 52, at 9; Dhir, supra note 1, at 151. 
115 Dhir, supra note 52, at 592.  
116 Hunt et al., supra note 64 , at 23.  
117 Id.  
118 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 66, at 296–98.  
119 Id. at 295.  
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should at least better the monitoring function of the board and lead to better 
performance as an organization.120  
 
ii. Increased Independence 
By virtue of being “outsiders” with fresh perspectives, female 
directors are typically more independent than their male counterparts.121 
Increased independence has been thought to be a positive change for quite 
some time in the corporate governance realm.122 Dating back to when 
Jensen and Meckling proposed the Theory of the Firm in the 1970s, board 
independence has in Tingle’s opinion become conflated with corporate 
governance.123 Management, the agent of the shareholders, must be 
monitored by the board in order to ensure that the agents are acting within 
the principals’ best interests and not only their own.124 Therefore it is 
thought that the more independent the directors are, the better monitors of 
management they will be. Hence, the more female directors a board has, 
the more independent the board will be and thus the stronger monitors of 
management.125 Adams and Ferreira note that in their large sample of S&P 
corporations, 84.07% of female directors acted as independent directors.126 
Research also indicates that female directors tend to engage in tougher 
monitoring of management.127 In addition, it has been empirically shown 
that greater female representation on boards leads to greater CEO turnover 
when stock performance is poor.128 This relationship is not shown simply 
when there is a greater presence of independent directors generally, but 
only when these directors are female.129  
                                                   
120 Id.  
121 Carter, supra, note 52 at 8. 
122 Id.  
123 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Finan. Econ. 
305 (1976); Bryce C. Tingle, What Is Corporate Governance? Can We Measure 
It? Can Investment Fiduciaries Rely on it?, 43 Queen’s L. J. 223, 229 (2018). 
124 Dhir, supra note 1, at 27.  
125 Id.  
126 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 66, at 293–94. Director independence 
in this article is defined as the Investor Responsibility Research Center defines it. 
A director is independent if they do not have business relations with the firm, have 
no relation to management and are not and have never been an employee of the 
firm. 
127 Dhir, supra note 1, at 167. 
128 Id. 
129 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 66, at 301.  
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iii. Corporate Reputation 
Part of the business case which does not relate directly to financial 
performance, but which may have an indirect effect on a corporation’s 
share price at least, is the idea that increased board gender diversity 
enhances corporate reputation.130 This is a very difficult portion of the 
business case to criticize as it seems to be supported both pragmatically 
and by empirical evidence.131 Even serious critics of corporate governance 
predictors in both the United States and Canada cannot deny the fact that 
in this age corporate reputation is crucially important to a business’ 
functioning and ultimately may impact upon its share price.132 Last year, 
BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink wrote a letter to the CEOs of public 
companies, expressing his opinion that diversity is better for the long-term 
of the corporation and for its shareholders.133 Thus, even if one does not 
accept that a corporation’s reputation may suffer if it has poor board 
diversity, it may still be the case that the corporation becomes the target of 
shareholder activism.134  
Further, those with better corporate reputations may have 
opportunities that corporations with poorer reputations do not.135 For 
example, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) recently 
launched a Women in Leadership Fund, a prospectus offering for a fund 
that is only available to corporations which have a minimum of 30% 
female executives, female board members, or who have signed the 
Catalyst 2022 Accord.136 This fund also excludes companies who deal 
mainly in the business of alcohol and tobacco, among other things, and 
those which have been linked to major social or governance scandals.137  
 
                                                   
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs Purpose & Profit, 
BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-
ceo-letter.  
134 Id.  
135 Alexandra Posadzki, CIBC to Launch Canada’s First Women in 
Leadership Bond for Institutional Investors, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Sept. 11, 
2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/streetwise/article-cibc-to-
launch-canadas-first-women-in-leadership-bond-for; see also Catalyst, Catalyst 
Accord 2022: Accelerating The Advancement of Women, CATALYST (Nov. 8, 
2012), https://www.catalyst.org/catalyst-accord-2022. 
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iv. The Weaknesses of the Governance Case 
The difficulties with the governance case are two-fold. First, 
similarly to the financial performance case, the governance case is fraught 
with inconsistent empirical evidence. In a review of the literature 
regarding the presence of greater board diversity and corporate 
governance, Rhode and Packel note “[o]verall, studies on the relationship 
between board diversity and its capacity for strategic change have reached 
conflicting results.”138 They also outline the conflicting empirical results 
concerning whether diversity enhances monitoring or whether it hinders 
communication between the board and management.139 Adams and 
Ferreira’s study illustrates that because female directors are typically 
stronger monitors than their male counterparts, greater gender diversity 
can lead to over-monitoring and hurt boards that already perform well. So 
in some contexts where a firm is already performing well, it is possible 
that increasing the number of female directors on a board may damage 
governance.140 
Secondly, it is not clear that typical corporate governance 
predictors lead to increased firm performance in general. There is still a 
question of whether director independence benefits a firm financially. 
Practices identified by regulators and policymakers as corporate 
governance best practices are not always accurate indicators of how well 
a corporation will perform financially, whether it will be involved in a 
scandal or whether it will fail.141  
 
3. The Talent Case 
“At Catalyst, we encourage companies to go beyond the 
traditional business case by focusing on diversity and inclusion as talent 
issues, rather than as the ‘bottom line.’”142 This is a third iteration of the 
business case and it is by no means a new one. For instance, Carter et al. 
in 2007, in describing the business case for board diversity, include the 
fact that increased diversity means access to a wider talent pool.143 In a 
more recent study, Eastman et al. found companies with at least three 
                                                   
138 Rhode & Packel, supra note 49, at 397. 
139 Id. at 398. 
140 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 66, at 305. 
141 Sonnenfeld, supra note 111; Tingle, supra note 123, at 246. 
142 Carter & Wagner, supra note 53. 
143 Carter et al., supra note 52, at 10. 
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female directors outperformed those with none144. They supported these 
findings with two hypotheses, one of which is that well-performing 
corporations with more female directors were making better use of the 
talent supply available to them.145  
In a study of venture capitalist investment firms, Gompers and 
Kovali partly accounted for their finding, that diverse partnerships led to 
higher returns than homogenous ones, by drawing a comparison between 
their results and the upturn in the economy after the 1960s.146 This 
economic boom was because the labor market began accessing both 
women and people of color.147  
Dhir explains another facet of the talent case in the Canadian 
context. He describes a phenomenon where Canadian corporations were 
actually losing talented women to other countries more concerned with 
board diversity, which were better at seeking and recruiting talented 
women.148 He thus advocated for policy intervention to catalyze the slow 
growth of board diversity in Canada.149 Interestingly, Dhir was writing at 
a time when the diversity disclosure policy in Canada was very new, and 
yet his point that voluntary efforts in Canada to increase boardroom gender 
diversity had not worked is still true today.150 
 
Pool Problem 
The talent case rationale runs up against one of the most common 
arguments used by those who oppose stronger regulation to increase the 
number of women on boards. This argument is the “pool problem”. Those 
who are convinced that there is a lack of qualified female candidates are 
unlikely to be persuaded that firms should simply extend their search 
beyond the pool which they consider “qualified”. Qualifications for board 
candidacy usually include executive experience with an emphasis on CEO 
experience.151 The pool may not, in fact, be a problem. Dhir argues that 
the pool problem might be based on an inaccurate conception of the 
                                                   
144 Eastman, Rallis & Mazzucchelli, supra note 63, at 6–9, 11. 
145 Id. 
146 Id.  
147 Paul Gompers & Silpa Kovvali, The Other Diversity Dividend, 
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (July 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/the-other-
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Canadian and US labor markets.152 It could also be that women are held 
more strictly to the CEO standard than male candidates.153  
It may be that successful corporations tend to have more diverse 
boards because they have the means to support diversity efforts.154 It is 
possible that these are the corporations better able to recruit the most 
qualified diverse candidates.155 It is not clear that by extending the pool of 
what they consider qualified candidates, lower performing corporations 
would realize a diversity dividend.156 This line of thinking, of course, rests 
on the assumption that it is not diversity which creates value at high 
performing firms and the correlation runs the other way.157 If, on the other 
hand, we accept that diversity brings instrumental value, then this justifies 
extending the pool within which director candidates are found.158 Thus, 
the pool problem falls flat. Another interesting counter to this is the reverse 
pool problem.159 In the Erhardt et al. study, the authors point to the fact 
that at the time of writing there was a dearth of qualified male candidates 
to fill board positions.160 This may not still be a problem, but, if it is, then 
an expanded pool of candidates would be necessary to account for this 
pool problem.161 
Business Case Conclusion 
“Given the competing findings and methodological limitations of 
these studies, the financial benefits of board diversity should not be 
overstated.”162 The business case in its current formulation may need some 
reworking if it is to be compelling enough to effect real change.163 
However, given that there is certainly a lack of evidence which goes 
against the financial performance based business case, the empirical 
                                                   
152 Dhir, supra note 1, at 38–42. 
153 Id. at 41. 
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evidence generally does not hinder the normative rationale for greater 
gender diversity on boards in both the United States and Canada.164 
More broadly, the business case faces the challenge that is 
described by Rosenblum and Dhir. That is, if we justify increased gender 
diversity on boards by arguing that it will lead to better firm performance, 
this makes it seem that if women cannot show their instrumental worth, 
they do not deserve a seat at the table.165  For proponents of gender 
diversity, this again does not damage the normative case.166 Unless the 
empirical evidence definitively proves that gender diversity impairs 
financial performance, there is still a compelling case for increasing board 
gender diversity on normative grounds.167  
Another reason why the business case has yet to be convincing is it is 
“inextricably linked with the moral or social case for board diversity 
because moral and social rationales are embedded in the so-called business 
case.”168 This point will be addressed in greater detail below. 
 
B. The Normative Case 
The normative case is far less complex than the business case. It has 
two versions. The first is that gender diversity on boards should be 
promoted as it is simply the right thing to do.169 The second is that it is 
right to promote diversity on corporate boards because the diverse groups 
(women and ethnic minorities) are those which have been historically 
disadvantaged.170 We should, therefore, have regulation to ameliorate this. 
These versions of the normative case are identically conceptualized in the 
United States and Canada, and can be seen above in the Canadian and 
American regulators’ discussions of the diversity policies.171 A McKinsey 
report recognizes that “social justice, legal compliance, or maintaining 
industry-standard employee environment protocols is typically the initial 
                                                   
164 Id. They point out that even though there is no clear relationship 
between greater gender diversity and firm financial performance, this does not 
eliminate the normative case for increasing gender diversity on boards and that 
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impetus behind these [diversity] efforts . . .”172 Paul Davies and Klaus 
Hopt, in discussing European policy reforms related to board diversity, 
said: “Although both reforms are advocated on the basis that they will 
promote the economic success of the company, it is not clear whether this 
will be the case and it is even less clear whether economic success from 
the perspective of the shareholders is the objective of the reforms.”173 
Thus, the catalyzing factor behind reforming board diversity policies is 
usually rooted in the normative case.174  
If one accepts a purely normative case, stronger regulation such as 
quotas seems to be the logical solution to the lack of female directors.175 
However, normative objectives influencing the regulation of the inner 
workings of corporate boards in the private sector will not be able to 
escape the business case in the US and Canada.176 The securities regulators 
are charged with promoting fairness and efficiency in the capital 
markets.177 Their mandates make it very difficult, if not impossible, to 
openly pursue an objective which is purely normative.178  
There is though, as Rosenblum points out, a certain amount of 
normative “slippage” into the business case.179 The regulators in the US 
and Canada, as described above, support their use of diversity regulation 
with business case and investor protection rationales.180 Yet, they seem to 
in fact be working from a normative-based rationale.181 One can see this 
from the fact that the Ontario and Federal governments in Canada 
instructed the OSC to tackle this issue in order to “facilitate an increase in 
the participation of women on the boards . . . .”182 Unlike the SEC, these 
government actors are transparent about the end result which the 
regulation is to achieve, a result that appears to be indifferent to any likely 
                                                   
172 Id. 
173 Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Corporate Boards in Europe - 
Accountability and Convergence, European Corporate Governance Institution 
Working Paper 61 AMJCL 301, 330 (2013). 
174 Id. 
175 The Role of the SEC, supra note 9; Ontario Securities Act supra note 
39. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Rosenblum, supra note 47, at 440. 
180 The Role of the SEC, supra note 9; Ontario Securities Act supra note 
39. 
181 Id. 
182 Consultation Paper, supra note 44, at 3. 
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effect of increased board diversity on firm performance. It is notable that, 
in the case of Ontario, it was the Minister Responsible for Women’s 
Issues, in conjunction with the Minister of Finance, and not the Minister 
of Finance alone, who provided this instruction.  
 
In the US, from Luis Aguilar’s speech as discussed above, we see 
a similar normative slippage. He even suggests that a Rooney Rule may 
be useful in promoting board diversity. The Rooney Rule was a technique 
used by the NFL to encourage more diverse hiring of coaches in which at 
least one diverse candidate was to be interviewed in the final rounds of 
hiring.183  
 
The Normative Case’s Biggest Hurdles 
 
i. The Board’s Role is to Maximize Shareholder Wealth 
 
Perhaps the most powerful argument opponents of stronger 
regulation have in their arsenal is based on the premise that the board’s 
role is primarily to maximize shareholder wealth. In the United States, the 
conception of the board’s role as a shareholder wealth maximizer, 
especially where a change of control is inevitable, is fairly well accepted. 
Generally, in the US, the directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation 
as a whole and the shareholders thereof.184 In a takeover context, where a 
change of control is inevitable, the board’s duty according to the Revlon 
line of cases becomes a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.185 In 
Canada, on the other hand, in both the federal and provincial corporate 
statutes, the board’s fiduciary duty is only owed to the corporation as a 
                                                   
183 Aguilar, supra note 14. 
184  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
182 (Del. 1986). The Delaware Chancery court held that considering 
stakeholders’ interests who are not stockholders is inappropriate if a change of 
control transaction is inevitable. Once this threshold is reached, the role of 
directors shifts to auctioneers and they must maximize shareholder wealth. 
185 Id. The Revlon duty was interpreted and narrowed in Paramount 
Communications In. v Time Inc.571 A.2d 1140,1150 (Del.1989). The Revlon duty 
in Time, was held not to apply if a change of control transaction in inevitable, but 
where the control will still be widely dispersed and there will be no controlling 
shareholder.  
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whole.186 Although there is reason to think that the Revlon duty has been 
applied in Canada –187 since at least 2008 – the Canadian Supreme Court 
in its BCE decision, 188 ruled that even in a Revlon-type situation, the board 
should consider all stakeholders rather than simply the shareholders in 
making its decision.189 So the duty of the board as a shareholder wealth 
maximizer in Canada is less clear. However, it is important to note that the 
board in BCE, even after considering other stakeholders, made a decision 
that favored the wealth maximization of its shareholders and the court was 
unwilling to strike this decision. Therefore, one could argue that despite 
the more stakeholder-centric model in Canada, a board is still at least 
permitted to prioritize the shareholders so long as it also fairly considers 
other stakeholders in its decision. 
 
If one assumes that a board’s role is to maximize shareholder 
wealth, one is led to the ultimate conclusion that boards should only 
undergo large scale transformation if this will benefit the corporation’s 
shareholders. Under this assumption, it is difficult to justify a quota-based 
regulatory model unless this will also generate shareholder wealth.  Even 
more challenging, is the evidence from Norway. When a quota was 
introduced for women on boards, public corporations were left scrambling 
to find additional women to sit on their boards, leading in some cases to 
the appointment of less experienced directors. This caused, it has been 
argued, a downturn in the market and losses for the shareholders of these 
companies.190 Schwartz-Ziv’s study of Government Business Companies 
in Israel, though, shows better financial performance when there was 
gender balance on boards for over 20 years in a context where the 
corporations are required by law to maximize shareholder value.191 This is 
                                                   
186 Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-44, §122 (Can., 
1985); Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c B16, §134 (Can., 
1990). 
187 CHRISTOPHER C NICHOLLS, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND OTHER 
CHANGES OF CORPORATE CONTROL, 2nd ed. ed, 229–232 (2012). See page 229–
239 for detailed account of how Revlon has been interpreted by Canadian courts. 
188 BCE Inc. v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 S.C.R. 69 [“BCE”]. 
189 Id. at para. 40. This decision has since been codified into the Canada 
Business Corporations Act. See Canada Business Corporations Act, supra note 
186 at §122(1.1) and Bill C-97 An Act to implement certain provisions of the 
budget tabled in Parliament on March 19, 2019 and other measures, 1st Sess, 42nd 
Parliament, 2019 (assented to 21 June 2019) at s 141.    
190 Ahern & Dittmar, supra note 67 at 168.  
191 Schwartz-Ziv, supra note 62. 
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an excellent example of the positive effect of adequate gender 
representation over the course of many years in a context where 
shareholder wealth maximization is mandated and where gender parity 
increases financial performance. More generally, one could argue that so 
long as no damage to the capital markets can be reasonably linked to 
regulatory efforts to improve gender diversity on boards, such regulation 
in Canada and the US is justified purely on the basis that it is the right 
thing to do.  
 
ii. Command-and-Control Regulation is Inappropriate State 
Interference with the Private Sector 
State interference with the inner-workings of the corporate board 
is perceived in a negative light in both jurisdictions, but perhaps more 
strongly in the United States.  American legal scholarship, views 
command-and-control measures disdainfully.192 In Short’s review of 
American legal scholarship over a 25 year period, she found that the most 
common criticism was that command-and-control regulation is a form of 
state coercion with a negative impact upon the choices of those subject to 
the regulation.193 Opponents of command-and-control are especially 
critical of the SEC regulating corporate governance. The SEC, in the 
opinion of some, does not have the appropriate tools to deal with the issue 
of corporate governance. For instance, Gallagher, an SEC Commissioner, 
in criticizing the SEC’s attempts to meddle in corporate governance, 
asserted: “If most corporate governance issues are a nail, the states 
represent a hammer, while the SEC represents, say, a wrench, or worse yet 
a sledge hammer! Let’s not become the wrench in the works of corporate 
governance when we have a toolbox full of fifty hammers.”194  Epstein, in 
comparing the EU’s proposed quota mandate and the US’ flexible 
approach, asserts: “The question then arises of why it makes sense, in this 
time of economic malaise, to impose this costly and intrusive quota on 
firms that already have every incentive to pick the best board members”.195 
His article, written in 2012, provided a hint as to what reaction a quota 
mandate in the US might receive. Alstott makes the point clear. She says 
“quotas sit uneasily with deeply-held beliefs (in the United States) about 
                                                   
192 Dhir, supra note 1 at 94. 
193 Short, supra note 45 at 662. 
194Daniel M Gallagher, The Proper Role of the Federal Government in 
Corporate Governance, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/02/01/the-proper-role-of-the-federal-
government-in-corporate-governance/. 
195Epstein, supra note 51.  
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the role of government and law in regulating business.”196 In Canada, 
command-and-control is less feared and the securities regulators do not 
face the same challenge as the SEC because it is thought to be within the 
purview of Canadian securities regulators to regulate corporate 
governance.197 
Short counters the opponents of command-and-control regulation 
with a persuasive argument that “tyrannophobia” when it comes to 
securities regulation and taxes is a misplaced fear. Tyrannophobia in this 
context, she advances, not only detracts from real issues of inappropriate 
state interference (such as torture and secret wiretapping) but it also makes 
it difficult for regulators to properly address issues because they constantly 
have to be concerned with rebutting command-and-control based 
arguments.198 Thus, it may be that fear of command-and-control is more a 
distraction from the real problems in need of regulation than a constructive 
form of discourse in an age of complex financial institutions and capital 
markets capable of destroying the economy if not run properly.  
 
iii. Let the Market Decide 
 
Richard Epstein, in comparing the American approach to gender 
diversity to that of the EU, provided the following critique of the European 
approach:  
 
“Women are, in ever-larger numbers, graduating from 
universities with advanced degrees in business and 
                                                   
196 Anne Alstott, Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options for 
Legal Design in the United States 26 Pace Int’l L. Rev. Symposium Ed., 38, 44 
(2014). 
197 It is generally accepted in Canada that the securities regulators can 
regulate corporate governance. Perhaps this is because securities in Canada up 
until now have been provincially regulated. In the US many view corporate 
governance as something which should only be regulated by the states and not the 
federal government. For an account of the federalization of corporate governance 
in the US see, MARC I STEINBERG, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2018); and for a critique of the federalization of corporate 
governance, see Jason Parsont, The Proper Role of the Federal Government in 
Corporate Governance, (February 1, 2013) CLS BLUE SKY BLOG , available at 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/02/01/the-proper-role-of-the-federal-
government-in-corporate-governance/. 
198 Short, supra note 45at 681–682. 
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management. As they move up the ranks, their presence 
on boards may well increase, wholly without quotas…. 
Firms have every incentive to pick the best board 
members, male or female… So what is the difference 
between the Wall Street Journal and the EU’s approach? 
Simple. The former uses voluntary action and enlists 
high-profile leaders to make its case, while the latter uses 
coercion in a ham-handed effort to achieve some narrow 
and counterproductive initiative toward the same general 
end.”199 
 
This combines both fear of coercion and the supposition that if 
given time the markets will correct the under-representation of women on 
boards. The latter is a similar argument, found in Fountain’s paper. She 
purports that the best remedy for the issue of women on boards may be 
time. The market will adjust to the social pressure placed on large 
corporations to enhance board gender diversity.200 There is clearly an 
increasing push for diversity efforts in the market as well. As discussed 
above, Larry Fink’s letter and the launch of CIBC’s Women in Leadership 
Fund are just two examples of pushes from the private sector rather than 
government indicating that the market is moving in the direction of 
demanding greater gender diversity on corporate boards. One view of the 
regulators’ initiatives is that they were responding to market developments 
as expressed by comments from investors who saw boardroom diversity 
as a laudable goal.201  
However, scholars have illustrated the flaws with this market 
evolution argument. In the OSC’s 2013 Roundtable regarding women on 
boards, in discussing the rate of change, a panelist, Pamela Jeffrey, 
remarked, “we will not be anywhere close to gender parity until 2097 at 
this pace of change here between half a percent and a percent a year. So 
2097, we're all dead, and our children are dead, and our grandchildren. So 
let's get on with [it].”202 Although the rate of change has improved since 
2013, in Canada it will still take approximately 50 more years to reach 
                                                   
199 Epstein supra note 51. 
200 Fountain, supra note 50 at 95.  
201 Final Rule, supra note 4 at 68343; National Instrument 58-101F1: 
Notice and Request for Comment in Proposed OSC Amendments to Form 58-
101F1 Corporate Governance Disclosure of National Instrument 58-101 
Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices : Proposed Disclosure 
Requirements Regarding the Representation of Women on Boards and in Senior 
Management, ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION (2014). 
202 Roundtable Discussion Re Women on Boards and Senior 
Management, supra note 38. 
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gender parity, and this is assuming that board seats will be filled by 50% 
women, a higher female fill rate than there currently is.203 In the US, it is 
predicted that it will take similarly approximately 30 years to reach gender 
parity.204 Thus, even assuming a higher fill-rate than there is in Canada, 
the market likely will not correct this problem until the writer is 
approaching old age.  
 
C. How The Regulators Use the Business Case 
and the Normative Case 
The SEC and the OSC have very similar mandates. The SEC’s is 
to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and to 
facilitate capital formation.205 The OSC’s is to protect investors from 
unfair, improper or fraudulent practices,  to foster fair and efficient capital 
markets and confidence in capital markets, and to contribute to the stability 
of the financial system and the reduction of systemic risk.206 Thus, the 
policies, which each of these regulators can implement, must fit within 
virtually identical scopes. 
Further to the discussion above, the OSC in its Request for Comment on 
the proposed NI 58-101F1 amendments said the following: “The Proposed 
Amendments are intended to encourage more effective boards and better 
corporate decision making by requiring greater transparency for investors 
and other stakeholders regarding the representation of women on boards 
and in senior management of TSX-listed and other non-venture issuers. 
This transparency is intended to assist investors when making investment 
and voting decisions.”207 Most recently at the 2017 roundtable discussing 
                                                   
203 Roundtable Discussion - Third  Review of Women on Boards and in 
Executive Officer Positions ONT. SEC. COMMISSION (Oct. 24, 2017), 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-
Category5/sn_20171103_transcript-wob-roundtable.pdf. 
204 SB 826, supra note 6 at section 1(a).  
205SEC’S Role, supra note 9. 
206 Ontario Securities Act, supra note 39 at section 1.1. 
207 National Instrument 58-101F1: Proposed OSC Amendments to Form 
58-101F1 Corporate Governance Disclosure of NI 58-101 Disclosure of 
Corporate Governance Practices - Proposed Disclosure Requirements 
Regarding the Representation of Women on Boards and in Senior Management, 
ONT. SEC.COMMISSION, (Jan. 15, 2014), 
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women on boards, OSC Chair, Maureen Jensen, said that the Commission 
views this as a “governance issue”.208 However, in light of both the above 
quote by the Minister for Women’s Issues and given that it was the 
Minister for the Status of Women and not just the Minister of Finance 
obliging the Commission to look at this issue, the true purpose of the 
gender diversity proposal seems clear: that is, to advance a goal rooted in 
fairness.  
Likewise, in the US, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar’s 
comments show that the true intentions of item 407(c) in Regulation S-K 
seem to be rooted in promoting a normative goal, rather than in protecting 
investors.209 Aguilar made the following statement in 2013: “Given the 
evidence of the impact diversity on boards has on the bottom line and the 
boardroom changes taking place with our counter- parts across the globe, 
gender diversity – and diversity in general – should be a priority for U.S. 
companies and their boards."210 Aguilar went on to claim that corporate 
board diversity was important to investors and board diversity disclosure 
will help investors make informed decisions.211 Thus, the rationale behind 
the diversity disclosure regime was almost identical to the one provided 
by the Canadian securities regulators. It includes the notion that board 
diversity will enhance financial performance, that it will lead to improved 
corporate governance, and that it will better protect investors. However, 
Aguilar’s speech also reveals a normative rationale behind the disclosure 
policy.   
 
What is striking in the US and Canada is that although they 
implemented different board diversity regulatory regimes at different 
times for allegedly different reasons, the work each disclosure model has 
done is similar. There has not been a dramatic change to the number and 
percentage of women on boards in either jurisdiction since these 
                                                   
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_ni_20140116_58-101_pro-amd-
f1.htm.. 
208 Third Review of Women on Boards and in Executive Officer Positions, 
supra note 203. 
209 This is not to say that the two are mutually exclusive, only that the 
priority seemed not to be in protecting investors, but rather in advancing a social 
justice goal. 
210 Luis Aguilar, Merely Cracking the Glass Ceiling Is Not Enough: 
Corporate America Needs More than Just A Few Women in Leadership (May 22, 
2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch052213laahtm. 
211 Id. 
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reforms.212 Perhaps this is because the conceptions of the problem board 
diversity proposals are designed to address in both the US and Canada and 
their respective solutions are almost identical. Moreover, perhaps 
corporations have remained unconvinced of the financial or other 
governance benefits of board diversity and believe that the securities 
regulators are in fact advancing a normative goal indirectly through these 
regimes.   
 
As discussed above, “normative slippage” could be what has so 
confounded securities regulators. Both the SEC and the OSC used the 
business case rationale in justifying their current diversity regimes. Yet, 
the regulators encounter serious difficulty when they attempt to regulate 
what is truly a social justice or fairness issue masked in business case 
rationales. The result of this in both the US and Canada is weak diversity 
policies which have not made a noticeable difference in advancing the 
social justice goals which appear to be the primary motivation behind the 
implementation of such policies. Even if we accept that the true objectives 
of the policies were to increase board gender diversity to enhance firm 
performance, neither increases board gender diversity or enhances firm 
performance. Another regulatory option, of course, is a regulation which 
is intrusive and which faces broader administrative law challenges. The 
regulators cannot be seen to damage the capital markets (which is arguably 
what occurred in Norway, with its abrupt introduction of a mandatory 
quota) nor can they be seen to act beyond their mandate. What then is the 
answer? That is yet unclear, but perhaps with a re-statement of the business 
case and the lessons which the securities regulators can take from the 
example discussed below, regulations encouraging enhanced gender 
diversity which do not conflict with other laws can be implemented. 
 
                                                   
212 Before the diversity disclosure policy was implemented in the US, 
women represented 12% of S&P board members in 2009. See Fairfax, supra note 
52 at 87. Similarly in Canada, before NI 58-101F1 was amended to include the 
diversity disclosure regime, women represented 11% of board seats of publicly 
traded corporations of directors of reporting issuers. See Consultation Paper, 
supra note 44 at 2. Currently, as previously mentioned, women in the US and 
Canada represent 17.7% and 15% of board seats of public corporations 
respectively, see notes 2 and 3. 
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III. HANG TEN: THE CHANGING TIDE IN THE WAKE OF CALIFORNIA 
SENATE BILL 826 
A. What It Says and Why It Was Drafted 
Senate Bill No. 826 (Bill 826) was recently signed in California. 
This Bill adds sections 301.3 and 2115.5 to the Corporations Code. Bill 
826 requires public corporations with “principal executive offices” located 
in California to have a minimum of one female director. This minimum 
number is to increase over time to at least two female directors if the board 
has five or more members, or 3 directors if the board has at least six 
members by the year 2021.213 In its declaration, the legislature outlined 
several rationales for this highly intrusive bill. First, it states in no 
uncertain terms, that more female directors on public corporations’ boards 
will have a positive impact on California’s economy.214 It then lists a 
number of empirical studies, the results of which indicate a positive 
relationship between greater gender diversity and enhanced financial 
performance.215 Further on, it synthesizes a number of studies which 
attempt to show that a critical mass of women increases the board’s 
efficacy, including the McKinsey report as described above.216 In sections 
1(e)-(f), the declaration describes the particulars of under-representation 
of women on corporate boards in California, specifically mentioning that 
as of June 2017, only 15.5% of board seats in California were occupied by 
women. It is estimated that at the current rate it will take 40 to 50 years to 
reach gender parity among Russell 3000 companies across the United 
States.217 
 
By March 1 2020, the Secretary of State will publish a list of those 
corporations who are in compliance with Bill 826, those that moved their 
head offices in to or out of California, and those that were subject to the 
law but that went private in the preceding year.218 Finally, there will be 
fines of $100 000 for first time violations of these amendments and $300 
000 for subsequent violations levied against firms that do not comply. 219 
 
                                                   
213 Bill 826, supra note 6 at 94. 
214 Id. at section 1(a).  
215 Id. at section 1(c). 
216 Id. at section 1(g). 
217 Id. at subsections 1 (e)-(f). 
218 Id. at section 2(d). 
219 Id. at section 2(e). 
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A few important things can be gleaned from the text of the 
amendments themselves and from the Legislative Declaration 
accompanying them. First, the legislature is still attempting to justify a law 
with a business case rationale based on financial performance arguments 
while also recognizing that, notwithstanding any performance advantages, 
this is simply the right thing to do. Bill 826 runs into the same difficulty 
as the other American and Canadian regimes and the business case in 
general. That is, it justifies increased gender diversity on corporate boards 
by citing the instrumental value this will bring, implying that in the 
absence of such financial value it may not be worth doing. While largely 
focusing on the financial performance case, the very first section of the 
bill asserts that increasing the number of female board directors will, in 
turn, lead to more opportunities for women in the workplace and laments 
the fact that if something is not done, gender parity will not be reached for 
40 to 50 years.220 Thus it is likely that this bill is in fact motivated by social 
justice considerations and not purely, or even primarily, economic reasons.  
 
B. Polarizing Reaction 
Bill 826 has already precipitated some polarized reactions in both 
the scholarly world and in the media. For those who support stronger 
regulation and are not as concerned about state interference with the 
private sector, this bill was more than welcome and its supporters hope 
that it will lead to some real change. On the other hand, for those who are 
less enthusiastic about state interference with the inner workings of the 
corporate board, and especially those who see Bill 826 as flouting the 
Internal Affairs Doctrine,221 this bill was a clear over-reach of state power 
and will not have any notable positive impact. 
 
                                                   
220 Id. at section 1(a). 
221 The Internal Affairs Doctrine is defined as: “the law that governs the 
relations among and between the corporation, its fiduciaries, and its stockholders 
is the law of the subject corporation’s state of incorporation.” Steinberg, supra 
note 197 at 2; see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 
(1986). 
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1. Those in Favor of Quotas 
While it is still early days, many applaud Bill 826 as a step in the 
right direction.222 As Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson puts it: “This is one of 
the last bastions of total male domination…We know that the public and 
business are not being well-served by this level of discrimination.”223 This 
comment, along with another statement she made to the press, makes it 
clear that this bill is rooted in social justice as well as business case 
rationales. In her other press statement, she said “…and I believe 
constitutional issues are ultimately for the courts to decide. Due to 
persistent inequality and discrimination at the highest levels of corporate 
leadership, women are being denied access and opportunity, and I believe 
there is an extremely compelling state interest in California moving 
forward to protect women and the state’s economy.”224  
 
Still others see the new regime as a way to achieve critical masses 
of women directors in the boardroom.225 Critical mass, as previously 
discussed, may be the missing link between greater board gender diversity 
and enhanced firm financial performance.  
 
Before this bill, scholars in the US and Canada had suggested 
quotas as a solution to the under-representation of women on boards. 
Willey, for instance, advocates for quotas as a short term fix. They may be 
what is necessary to effect immediate change in the current state of gender 
imbalance on boards in Canada. Though she acknowledges that 
implementation of quotas would likely be “an uphill battle,” in the 
alternative, she pushes for strengthening NI 58-101F1 with stated targets 
                                                   
222 See Emily Stewart, California Just Passed a Law Requiring More 
Women on Boards. It Matters, Even if It Fails, VOX (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/10/3/17924014/california-women-corporate-boards-
jerry-brown; Mary L. Walshok, Why It’s Time for More Women in the 
Boardroom, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (Nov. 21, 2018),  
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/commentary/sd-utbg-women-
boardroom-equity-california-20181121-story.html. 
223 Sophia Bollag, California is First State to Require Women on 
Corporate Boards, THE GLOBE AND MAIL  (Oct.r 1, 2018), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-california-is-first-state-to-
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224 Jena McGregor, Some Companies Still Don’t Have any Female 
Directors. California Wants to Fine Them, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2018),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/09/10/there-are-companies-
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within the comply-or-explain regime at the very least.226 She describes the 
current policy as an “explain-or-explain” rather than a comply-or-explain 
regime because the regulators have neglected to set actual targets against 
which company performance could be benchmarked.227 NI 58-101F1, she 
describes, is a weak intervention and one which will not effect, and indeed 
has not effected, much change.228  
 
In the US, Alstott, in 2014, also advocated for gender quotas on 
corporate boards in the US. She argues that the “the state makes massive 
expenditures to further social and economic policy under the guise of ‘tax 
incentives’.”229 Tax law further penalizes corporations for behavior that is 
socially harmful, which means Alstott reasons, that legislators are already 
advancing “substantive” corporate governance goals.230 In addition to tax 
law, securities regulation has engaged in substantive corporate governance 
since the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley. Alstott believes that if 
“designed with sensitivity to exceptional U.S. institutions,”231 quotas 
could fit very well within the US tax and securities laws. Importantly 
though, she notes that federal law is better suited to mandate quotas than 
state law.232  
 
Since Bill 826’s introduction, there has not been very much time 
for academics to publish papers about its implementation. However one 
scholar, Joseph Grundfest, has written a piece raising serious concerns 
about the Bill’s potential efficacy and approach to regulating gender 
diversity.233  
 
                                                   
226 Kim Willey, Bringing Canadian Women on Board: A Behavioural 
Economics Perspective on Whether Public Reporting of Gender Diversity Will 
Alter the Male-Dominated Composition of Canadian Public Company Boards 
and Senior Management, 29 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, 182, 208 
(2017). 
227 Id. at 193. 
228 Id. at 209. 
229 Alstott, supra note 196 at 41. 
230 Id. at 47. 
231 Id. at 40. 
232 Id. at 49. 
233 Joseph Grundfest, Mandating Gender Diversity in the Corporate 
Boardroom: The Inevitable Failure of California’s SB 826, SSRN Scholarly 
Paper ID 3248791 (2018). 
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2. Those Opposed 
Grundfest argues that Bill 826 will come up against the Internal 
Affairs Doctrine, and as a result its effects will be negligible.234 Because 
of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, the bill will only be applicable to 
corporations that are both incorporated under California corporate law and 
have their headquarters in California. Given the small number of large 
corporations that are both headquartered and incorporated in California, 
this leaves only 50 Fortune 500 corporations subject to the quota. Many of 
these corporations are already compliant with the bill’s provisions. 
Grundfest concludes that only one corporation, Apple, will have to add a 
female director to its board. In total, therefore, Grundfest asserts that Bill 
826 will result in the addition of one single female board member to the 
Fortune 500.235  Before it can make any difference, he says it will be 
subject to litigation regarding equal protection.236 Furthermore, he argues 
that this bill will set back other affirmative action causes. Opponents of 
affirmative action, Grundfest predicts, will use Bill 826 as the jumping off 
point of a slippery slope argument for what else in the private sector state 
and federal legislatures will be able to regulate.237 Lastly, he pushes for 
action by institutional investors, rather than legislators, in tackling this 
issue, as institutional investors can produce substantial change quickly.238 
Stephen Bainbridge provides a critique similar to Grundfest’s, adding that 
the application of the Internal Affairs Doctrine will be up to the US 
Supreme Court to decide, but given the jurisprudence, it will probably 
agree with the position that California cannot require corporations 
incorporated in other jurisdictions, such as Delaware, to add more women 
to their boards.239  
                                                   
234 Id. at 4–6. 
235 Id. 
236 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Grundfest speculates that Bill 826, if met 
with litigation, may be subject to enhanced scrutiny on equal protection grounds. 
Grunfest, supra note 233 at 6–8. For the most part, equal protection and how it 
relates to Bill 826 is beyond the scope of this paper. See Id. There has been one 
legal challenge launched in relation to Bill 826. Judicial Watch, a conservative 
activist group, has commenced a suit against California’s Secretary of State, 
which contains allegations that the law is discriminatory on the basis of sex and 
so unconstitutional, see Judicial Watch Sues California over Gender Quota 
Mandate for Corporate Boards, JUDICIAL WATCH (Aug. 9, 2019) 
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Others see the debate surrounding Bill 826 as a stakeholder versus 
shareholder issue. SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce made her thoughts on 
Bill 826 clear in a speech at the Annual SEC Conference for Corporate 
Reporting and Governance.240 She argues that proposals like those found 
in Bill 826 require corporations to consider not just its shareholders, but 
the interests of all women as stakeholders. “Opening such a wide door 
introduces uncertainty and political influence into corporate 
operations.”241 Peirce goes on to cite the US corporate law as it relates to 
directors’ duties which she interprets to be owed principally to 
shareholders.242 Aside from this picture of directors’ duties being up for 
debate, Peirce’s assertion that corporations with headquarters in California 
now must view all women as stakeholders is an overstatement. At most, 
these corporations may have to extend their searches for new directors to 
a wider range of candidates. At the very least, it will means corporations 
will be incentivized to consider those who have appropriate experience 
and who are qualified female candidates more seriously when they fill 
their board seats. 
 
Finally, the Californian Chamber of Commerce has come forward 
with criticism of the bill as well. The Chamber is for corporations 
autonomously deciding who should be on their boards. Furthermore, in its 
view, this bill will make other diversity initiatives more difficult. The vice-
president for policy has been quoted as saying: “It creates a challenge for 
a board on achieving broader diversity goals,”243 because it puts gender 
before other kinds of diversity, such as racial and ethnic diversity.244 
 
One common thread throughout the criticism of Bill 826, even for 
those who agree with the policy goals of the bill, is that it is likely to face 
extreme, if not fatal, constitutional challenges. 
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C. What Bill 826 May Mean for the Future  
in the United States and Canada 
If Bill 826 does withstand the challenges it faces, this may lead to 
a few outcomes. First, companies may simply ignore the quota and pay the 
fines. For large corporations especially, the fines may simply become a 
cost of doing business and certainly a few hundred thousand dollars every 
year will not put any issuer with a large market capitalization out of 
business. Bill 826 may have a greater impact on those publicly traded firms 
with smaller market capitalizations. A second possibility is that 
corporations will move their head offices out of California, which could 
have a negative impact on California’s economy. The opposite of this is 
also possible. In attempting to send a message to investors and the public, 
corporations which see diversity as a worthwhile endeavor may 
intentionally move their head offices to California, or comply with the 
provisions of the statute while remaining in other jurisdictions. 
 
 Since Bill 826’s implementation, other states have begun to 
implement similar legislation. A bill was signed in Illinois for instance 
which originally would have required Illinois corporations to have one 
female and one African American director. 245 However, before the bill 
was signed it was amended to require that firms only disclose the 
demographics of their boards.246 It has not become clear yet what this bill 
may mean for public companies in Illinois.247 More broadly in the US and 
                                                   
245 US, HB3394, An Act Concerning Business, 101st Gen Assem., Reg. 
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Erickson CBS News November 15, 2018, and 6:13 Pm, “House Democrats 
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Canada, perhaps California’s divisive bill will encourage other 
jurisdictions to follow suit. 
And perhaps this will also prompt a conversation in Canada 
between the provincial regulators and soon-to-be national regulator,248 
investors, scholars, and those subject to securities regulation. Canada, 
given its pattern of observing American corporate governance regimes and 
frequently implementing policies to imitate and sometimes improve upon 
them, may see this as an opportunity to push for stronger regulation.  
 
If indeed Bill 826 fails, then perhaps Canada and other US states 
can still learn from it, depending on the reason for its failure. For instance, 
if it is to fail because of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, then because Canada 
has no such doctrine, something like Bill 826 may still be successful in 
Canada. If it fails because corporations begin to use the fines as a license 
fee for doing business in California, then small companies will be much 
more likely to comply with the quotas than large companies. In Canada 
where there is a great deal of very small publicly traded corporations, the 
effects of a law like Bill 826 could be quite dramatic. Either way, 
California’s Bill 826 has already begun to make waves.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Although the United States and Canada have substantively 
different board diversity policies implemented for ostensibly different 
purposes, the impacts of both the SEC’s policy found in Regulation S-K 
and the Canadian policy found in NI 58-101F1 are strikingly similar. I 
have advanced the argument that both policies were met with very little 
traction because in truth both regulators implemented these policies out of 
a concern for what is right, rather than the reasons which the regulators 
openly provided. Moreover, the conceptions of the issue arising out of the 
under-representation of women on boards are the same in both 
jurisdictions. There is a slight diversion between the two in what the role 
of the board is and whether it is only to maximize shareholder wealth, or 
whether it is rather to fulfil a broader fiduciary duty to the corporation, 
which may involve considering non-shareholder interests.  
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American legal scholars historically seem to view command-and-
control regulation with much more passionate disdain than Canadian 
scholars as well. While American scholars harshly criticize command-
and-control regulation, the current Canadian diversity regime has not gone 
without criticism. It has been referred to as an “explain-or-explain policy” 
and a weak intervention.249 Interestingly, it was California that 
implemented a very stringent quota regime, not Canada. This law has so 
far polarized scholarly and media opinion. Perhaps other states will follow 
suit. Perhaps this bill will spark consideration of quotas in Canada. Or 
perhaps Bill 826 is destined to die at the hands of the Internal Affairs 
Doctrine.  
 
What is needed now is a re-statement of the business case; a re-
statement that outlines definitively why businesses and securities 
regulators should promote greater gender diversity on public corporate 
boards. This may require further research which takes into account critical 
mass and shareholder rights. Alternatively, regulators could be more 
transparent about what exactly the objectives are behind the diversity 
regimes they have implemented. They could justify stronger regulations 
with a clear assertion that they are advancing normative goals, so long as 
these regulations do not damage the capital markets and still fit within their 
mandates. If we accept Alstott’s argument that tax and securities regulators 
already promote social goals through substantive corporate governance 
regulation, then it does follow that the SEC could introduce a stronger 
diversity policy. What might be necessary in the scholarship is a definitive 
link between greater board gender diversity (outside of the traditional 
business case) and the regulators’ mandates.  
 
On the other hand, perhaps a multi-actor solution is the answer.250 
While institutional investors may be helping with the effort to increase 
boardroom diversity, the jury is still out on whether shareholder activism 
in general creates long-term value or whether it is only useful for creating 
short-term value.251  
 
There has been some small amount of progress made. If there is 
to be more, calls for diversity must not stop. Ultimately, in the US and 
Canada stronger regulation will be necessary that transparently recognizes 
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and works towards achieving what is right and what is good for business 
without conflating the two. 
